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Abstract: Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection
legislation. He says nothing about its material scope: which harmful practices it should
regulate. I argue, first, that most moral views would agree that the worst forms of animal
exploitation should be legally forbidden, even if there will inevitably be disagreement about
some cases of animal experimentation. I also argue that, when feasible, there should be legal
provisions to help wild animals.

Eze Paez is a postdoctoral researcher at the
Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society,
University of Minho, and a member of
Animal Ethics. He studies normative and
applied ethics, especially ontological and
normative aspects of abortion and the
moral consideration of nonhuman animals.
uminho.academia.edu/EzePaez

Jonathan Birch (2017) claims that when there is adequate evidence about the sentience of a
nonhuman animal species, it should be brought under the scope of animal protection
legislation. In that sense, Birch’s Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) functions as
the criterion for determining the subjective scope of such legislation: to which individuals it
applies. Nevertheless, as Birch (2017) himself admits (p. 8), his proposal needs to be further
specified regarding the material scope of that legislation. It is necessary to develop a criterion
to identify which harmful practices must be covered by its provisions. In that regard, I will
defend two claims: (a) because only morally unjustified harmful practices should be restricted,
there will inevitably be some disagreement about which ones fall within the law’s scope; (b)
animals should also be protected against unjustified harmful omissions.
1. Not all harmful practices. In a wide sense, all possible harmful practices towards animals
fall under the scope of animal protection legislation. This is because even with those for whom
there need be no specific provision, their legal status can be inferred from the general legal
principle that everything that is not forbidden is allowed. Here, however, I am concerned with
the material scope of animal law in a narrow sense: which harmful practices should be
restricted, either by permitting them only under some circumstances or by completely
prohibiting them.
According to Birch, the purpose of animal protection legislation is to prevent “serious,
negative animal welfare outcomes.” It must deal with practices that may, on aggregate, result
in predictably high negative well-being for the animals concerned. If they are to be restricted,
that is presumably because there is a risk that they are not morally justified. Thus, only
practices that are morally unjustified should fall under the purview of these laws.
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Nevertheless, whether a harmful practice is morally justified depends, on most views,
on the size of the expectable positive well-being that may be derived from it. For example, on
the basis of utilitarianism, it suffices that the result of causing serious harm to nonhuman
animals is, on aggregate, net positive. Other moral views, both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist, will require larger benefits (sometimes, much larger) for a harmful practice
to be justified. Inevitably, then, when determining the material scope of animal protection
legislation, we will find reasonable disagreement about which practices fall under it, and
whether they should be prohibited or, alternatively, permitted, provided that certain
conditions are met.
A case in point is animal experimentation for biomedical purposes, which Birch
frequently uses to illustrate his principle. From a utilitarian perspective, if the expected results
are net positive, taking into account the benefits for both humans and nonhumans, such
experiments would be justified (e.g., de Lazari-Radek & Singer, 2014). Other views, however,
would oppose using animals for such experiments unless the benefits are much greater. On
some deontological accounts, even, the constraint not to harm a sentient individual may never
be overridden, or only in order to prevent some moral catastrophe (Regan, 2004; Korsgaard,
2005). However, it is worth noting that such disparate moral theories can agree about the
need to establish strict legal requirements to minimise the pain and deprivation suffered by
these animals. That would include a preference to use those individuals whose sentience is
more uncertain. These are indeed the kinds of legislative measures Birch seems to have in
mind (Birch, 2017, pp. 8 and 12).
It is important, however, not to overstate the disagreement among different moral
views. Although the justifiability of animal experimentation may be, in this sense,
controversial, that is not the case regarding those human practices which are most harmful to
animals. Animal exploitation in the food industry, including factory farming and aquaculture,
is much worse, because of the larger number of animals subjected to it and the seriousness of
the harms the animals suffer. Provided that they reject speciesism, most moral theories would
agree that these forms of exploitation are morally unjustified, because the marginal benefit
human beings derive from them is minimal. For similar reasons, most moral theories would
agree that animal exploitation for other trivial purposes (clothing, entertainment,
manufacture and testing of cosmetic or household products) is likewise unjustified. There is
widespread agreement, then, that animal protection law should forbid practices such as those
involving nonhuman animals who meet Birch’s ASPP standard.
2. Serious harm by omission and a legal requirement of assistance. Harmful practices
affecting nonhuman individuals do not consist solely of human-bred animal exploitation or
experimentation. Wild animals are also harmed by human action. This is sometimes done for
sport, but on many occasions, by human interference in the wild for conservationist purposes.
An example of these negative interventions is killing individuals of ‘invasive’ species to
preserve autochthonous ones or as a method of population control. An animal protection law
which fully considered the interests of these animals would never condone harmful practices
of environmental management except to promote the overall well-being of the nonhuman
animals affected, and only insofar as less harmful methods were not available.
On the other hand, human non-interference with wild animals can be, arguably, even
more harmful for them. Life in nature is not idyllic. Because of the natural harms nonhuman
animals undergo, most of them have lives of net suffering (Ng, 1995; Horta, 2010; Tomasik,
2015; Faria, 2016). Presently, there is little that human beings can do about wild animal
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suffering on a large scale. In that respect, other pieces of legislation may incentivise research
on this issue. Yet many small- and medium-scale positive interventions on behalf of wild
animals are currently possible. These include providing them with some medical care against
injuries, as well as vaccination and feeding campaigns. It may eventually be possible
technically to extend to other animals welfare-state institutions we now take for granted for
humans in many countries. From an antispeciesist standpoint, such assistance should be
legally required.
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